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Armed Forces, Police and Crime-fighting 
in Latin America  
David Pion-Berlin and Miguel Carreras 
Abstract: Over the past two decades, the armed forces have increasingly 
been asked to take an active role in the fight against the rampant crime in 
Latin America. Since the militaries in this region are not always trained to 
conduct themselves with restraint, the possibility of excesses and human 
rights violations is always latent. Despite that prospect, there is a high 
level of public support for military counter-crime interventions through-
out the region. The key argument in this article is that when the Latin 
American public supports military interventions to combat crime, it 
makes a comparative judgment call about the relative efficacy of military 
vs. police conduct in domestic security roles. Latin American citizens 
have very low confidence in the capacity of the police to fight crime 
effectively and to respect human rights. They place more trust in the 
armed forces as an institution capable of performing effectively and in 
accordance with human rights standards and the rule of law. This study 
develops these arguments in greater detail and then turns to recent 
Americas Barometer surveys that clearly show that Latin American citi-
zens place more trust in the armed forces than the police as an institu-
tion capable of effectively and humanely fighting criminal violence. 
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Introduction 
Since the turn of the century, the armed forces have been increasingly 
asked to assist in the fight against crime in Latin America. Calls for mili-
tary intervention have escalated in tandem with the rise of larger, more 
lethal, and more sophisticated national and transnational criminal organi-
zations. It is evident that when governments enlist the help of the mili-
tary to fight these criminal elements, they do so with the firm backing of 
the public. In fact, constituents are often ahead of the politicians in de-
manding that tougher measures be taken, and that those measures specif-
ically include the deployment of soldiers.  
There are certainly reasons to be skeptical about the benefits of 
turning soldiers loose on city streets to hunt down members of criminal 
organizations. Militaries are normally trained to use uninhibited, explo-
sive force to subdue an enemy; they are not commonly prepared to con-
duct themselves with restraint or circumspection. There is an ever-
present theoretical possibility that soldiers could resort to excesses and 
violate human rights while chasing suspects. Despite that prospect, pub-
lic support for military counter-crime intervention seems undiminished. 
Why would this be so? 
A central contention of this study is that when the Latin American 
public supports military crime fighting, it makes a comparative judgment 
call about the relative efficacy of military versus police conduct in do-
mestic security roles. As our evidence will show, citizens of Latin Ameri-
ca have a rather dismal view of the police and are convinced these law 
enforcement officers can neither fight crime effectively nor respect the 
rights of those they are sworn to protect and serve. The citizens lack a 
fundamental trust in law enforcement to do its job in a successful, trans-
parent, and humane manner. By contrast, Latin American citizens place 
more trust in the armed forces as an institution capable of performing 
effectively, and in accordance with human rights standards and the rule 
of law. In other words, public support for military crime intervention is 
not an endorsement of repression or authoritarian solutions, so much as 
a belief – accurate or not – that the military can, compared to the police, 
better combat criminal elements without placing innocent civilians in 
harm’s way to the same degree. 
To defend these claims, we start by detailing the extent of crime and 
violence in the region and the public’s reaction to it. We then use statisti-
cal modeling to examine the reasons for widespread support for military 
crime-fighting operations, focusing on the impact of fear, victimization, 
dissatisfaction with police performance, and police corruption. We look 
at surveys indicating that, in contrast to negative perceptions about the 
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police, the armed forces are viewed more favorably; that is, as better 
trained and more respectful of human rights. These same models will 
demonstrate that there is an association between the public’s trust in the 
military and its belief that they respect human rights on the one hand, 
and their support for military crime fighting on the other.  
The Problem and Reactions to it 
Crime and violence are two of the most compelling and seemingly in-
tractable problems confronting Latin America today. Latin America is 
often described as the most violent region in the world (Parkinson 2014). 
Global homicide statistics corroborate this assertion, as can be observed 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Homicide Rates (Per 100,000 Population), by Region 
 
 
Source:  UNODC 2013.  
This figure shows the scale of the crime-related violence in Latin Ameri-
ca. The global homicide rate in 2012 was 8.3 per 100,000, and it was 
lower than 4 per 100,000 in three world regions (Asia, Europe, and Oce-
ania). By contrast, the homicide rate was 20.6 per 100,000 in the Ameri-
cas. Criminal violence is concentrated in South America, in the Caribbe-
an, and especially in Central America, where the homicide rate reaches 
34.3 per 100,000. Although criminal violence is on the rise throughout 
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the region, Figure 1 also shows that homicide rates are particularly high 
in certain Central American (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico) 
and South American (Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela) countries. 
These high crime rates also affect the attitudes and perceptions of 
Latin American citizens, as several polls and surveys have shown in the 
past decade. For instance, the 2014 wave of the Americas Barometer 
asked respondents what is the most important problem facing their 
countries; almost one-third of respondents (32.6 percent) considered 
criminal violence as the most serious problem.1 Unsurprisingly, the per-
centage of people who considered crime as the most serious problem 
was even higher in the most violent countries (for example, 47.9 percent 
in El Salvador and 65.2 percent in Honduras).  
Normally, it is the police that are sent to fight crime; they are, in 
theory, the first responders. However, the conundrum facing many Latin 
American states plagued by pervasive drug-related crime and violence 
(Bruneau 2011; Dammert 2012; Desmond Arias 2006) is that they are 
unable to rely on their police forces to provide citizens with the protec-
tion they demand. While police are normally at the front lines in the 
battles to defeat crime, they are also part of the problem: inept, corrupt, 
outnumbered, and outgunned by lethal criminal syndicates with suffi-
cient resources to purchase police docility or connivance. Even if they 
could hold their own against criminal organizations – which they cannot 
– police often lack the motivation to try. Instead, police throughout the 
region regularly skirt the law, and even cross the line into criminality, 
corruption, and rampant violence (Brinks 2008). Running drug opera-
tions and prostitution rings, committing extrajudicial killings and kid-
nappings, providing intelligence to drug traffickers, and abusing detain-
ees have become familiar police practices in a number of Latin American 
countries. Opportunities for these activities abound, as do motives, such 
as poor pay, poor training, and the knowledge that such transgressions 
will likely go unpunished. These police practices have also led to an ero-
sion in trust in the police and to low levels of satisfaction with the per-
formance of the police (Lagos and Dammert 2012). 
The obvious solution is to reform the police, but this is much easier 
said than done (Fuentes 2005; Uildriks 2009; Ungar 2012; Sabet 2012). 
                                                 
1  The exact question wording is “In your opinion, what is the most serious prob-
lem faced by the country?” We recoded the responses into a dummy variable. 
People who responded “crime”, “gangs”, “kidnappings”, “security (lack of)”, 
and “violence” were coded as 1 (that is, criminal violence is the most serious 
problem), and all other responses were coded as 0 (that is, criminal violence is 
not the most serious problem).  
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Police themselves do not want to be held to close scrutiny, fearing reve-
lations of incompetence, corruption, excessive violence, and criminality 
within their ranks. The police can call on a hardline coalition of political 
office holders, party leaders, and the public (Fuentes 2005), arguing that 
reform efforts could actually drive up crime by hampering the police’s 
resolve, hurting morale, and inviting hesitancy. They boil the problem 
down to a choice of either harsher measures or human rights observ-
ance, but not both (Ungar 2012). Politicians commonly accept this un-
fortunate tradeoff when they are confronted with constituents who are 
panicking about crime and calling for urgent responses to it. Politically 
expedient governments then opt for the easier, faster remedy that simply 
places more heavily armed police officers on the streets with a license to 
kill (Ungar 2012). 
Inevitably, however, those superficial responses fail to stem the tide 
of criminal violence. The excessive use of force backfires, as police – 
wittingly or unwittingly – threaten the very citizens they depend on to 
provide intelligence on suspected criminals. Residents shy away from 
sharing with law enforcement their localized knowledge of criminal ele-
ments, let alone their own harrowing personal experiences of victimiza-
tion, which is precisely the kind of information police need to uncover 
wrongdoing and make arrests. Consequently, police performance suffers 
and the public grows increasingly disenchanted. 
It is for these reasons that citizens commonly support and indeed 
request the introduction of the armed forces to help fight crime, com-
plementing and in some cases supplementing police units. When crime 
escalates, as it has in recent years throughout Latin America, voters pres-
surize their political leaders to deploy soldiers onto city streets when 
police have not been up to the task. In El Salvador, this took the form of 
mano dura in 2003 and, after that failed, super mano dura policies in 2007, 
which also failed. Interestingly, even in the face of failure, citizens will 
insist on hardline programs that use military force. By 2009, 93 percent 
of respondents in a poll conducted by El Salvador’s El Diario de Hoy still 
favored the use of soldiers to fight crime (IPS 2009; see also Pérez 2010). 
A similar pattern has been observed in Mexico. President Felipe 
Calderón (2006–2012) launched a war on drugs that was widely seen as 
ineffective. In 2009, Calderón resorted to a surge strategy, sending thou-
sands of soldiers to ‘take back’ northern cities under drug cartel domina-
tion, but victory proved elusive. Not only did homicides attributable to 
the war increase, but allegations of human rights abuses at the hands of 
army personnel grew as well. In 2012, when pollsters asked Mexicans 
who they thought had won the war, 54 percent said the criminals and 
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only 18 percent said the government. Yet, by October 2012, with the 
Calderón Sexenio coming to a close, and with no end in sight to the mur-
der and mayhem, 69 percent of those polled still maintained it was cor-
rect to use the army to combat organized crime (CESOP 2013: 39). 
In Latin America, the introduction of the military for internal secu-
rity purposes invokes historically based fears based in haunting memories 
of the past. During the years of de facto rule, the armed forces granted 
themselves authority to engage in widespread intervention. Guided by 
nefarious doctrines and ideological precepts constructed within the con-
text of the Cold War, they repeatedly sacrificed individual rights and 
freedoms on behalf of the national security state. However, even within 
the context of a democratic state, with constitutional protections in 
place, the common wisdom has been to avoid reintroducing the military 
into internal security at all costs; that to do so would be to invite harm to 
citizens, whether intentional or unintentional (Loveman 1999; Stepan 
1986). The military’s sin is no longer political or ideological hatred for 
the target population, although on certain occasions that may be so. 
Rather, it is most commonly over-reaction, a result of ingrained behav-
ior. Militaries are socialized into the use of maximum force. Conditioned 
by years of rigorous training and indoctrination, they are hard-wired to 
react in ways that are widely considered inappropriate and at odds with 
police functioning.2 Deploying army units in anticrime or antidrug opera-
tions in densely populated zones – often alongside police units – often 
invites trouble because militaries resist being compelled to abide by the 
principles of minimal use of force and due process, which are thought to 
interfere with combat effectiveness. The critics say that the result is ines-
capable: citizens will suffer repeated human rights abuses at the hands of 
soldiers. 
Whether the armed forces that conduct anti-crime operations are in 
fact guilty of repeated human rights transgressions is an empirical ques-
tion that is addressed below. Separate from that is the question of 
whether the public believes this is the case. Is the public convinced that 
military intervention opens the door to the use of unbridled force, result-
ing in human rights transgressions? If so, then are citizens who demand a 
military response to crime explicitly condoning a turn toward repressive 
                                                 
2  This training is called Continually Reinforced Functional Discipline (CRFD); 
see McDavid (2007). David Bayley (2001) argued that the military will contami-
nate community policing because it is trained to take orders from above rather 
than responding to citizen appeals; because it does not know how to use re-
strained force; it lacks mediation skills; and does not give soldiers powers of 
discretion. 
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measures? If they are not, then what is the basis upon which they sup-
port military crime-fighting intervention? 
Review of the Evidence 
Many nations have passed laws restricting the use of military force within 
national borders, and yet all nations of the region continue to allow for 
some form of military utilization under certain conditions.3 Even Argenti-
na, the country thought to have erected the highest hurdles, does allow 
for the internal deployment of armed forces in exceptional circumstanc-
es, when normal internal security forces are overwhelmed, and when 
ordered in by the president under constitutional state of siege provisions.  
Does the public favor military intervention to fight crime? In order 
to explore this question, we used a survey item present in the 2012 wave 
of the Americas Barometer, which asked respondents whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “The Armed Forces 
ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in [country].” The 
responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Figure 
2 presents the percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree 
with this statement (responses ranging from 5 to 7).  
The figure shows that there is widespread support for a military in-
tervention in anti-crime operations. In fact, 78 percent of respondents 
from 19 countries either agree or strongly agree with the statement that 
the army should help fight crime. This was true throughout the region, 
regardless of crime levels. While support was strong in high crime coun-
tries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela (on 
average 77.8), as expected, support for military intervention to fight 
crime was also considerable in countries with lower rates of crime such 
as Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador (71.6). This was also the case in 
Argentina, where past human rights abuses during the Dirty War had 
made that military an institutional pariah. In the years immediately fol-
lowing the transition to democracy, citizens there rejected any internal 
security role for their military, which is actually legally prohibited from 
engaging in law enforcement measures, except in rare circumstances, and 
as authorized under states of siege. Even there, over 61 percent of those 
recently polled now favor military intervention to fight crime. 
                                                 
3  Of those countries, 54 percent do so only with minimal restrictions, namely 
that it occur only with presidential authorization. Forty-six percent impose 
more formidable conditions, stating either that the military be used only under 
exceptional circumstances, or that it be confined to supportive roles. See Pion-
Berlin (2009). 
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Figure 2. Support for Military Anti-Crime Intervention, 2012 
 
Source:  LAPOP 2012. 
Why are citizens calling for military intervention? In the countries with 
the highest rates of crime in Central America, violence has reached un-
precedented levels, and political leaders there have referred to organized, 
gang-related activities as threats to national security. Crossing the thresh-
old from a public security peril to one of national dimensions justifies 
the introduction of the armed forces, since no other agency of state 
could effectively grapple with such an existential crisis. If the public 
agrees with that assessment, this would explain its support for introduc-
ing troops (Bailey, Parás, and Vargas 2011). 
A second and more likely explanation for region-wide trends is that 
the police have been unable to effectively respond to escalating crime 
and violence, leaving citizens frightened, frustrated, and searching for 
alternatives, including the assistance of the armed forces (Corbacho, 
Philipp, and Ruiz-Vega 2012; Lagos and Dammert 2012). As more police 
are brought into counter-crime activities, homicide rates actually trend 
upward; this is just one indication of police ineffectiveness. This was true 
in El Salvador, when the mano dura policy was introduced in 2003. Thou-
sands of additional police were deployed, but the homicide rate soared 
from 37 per 100,000 people in 2002 to 62.2 per 100,000 by 2005. Mano 
dura’s successor, super mano dura, introduced in 2007, fared no better, as 
homicide rates escalated to 70.9 by 2009 (UNODC 2013: 126). In Mexi-
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co, thousands of additional federal police were deployed to northern 
border cities in 2007 as part of President Felipe Calderón’s Drug War. 
However, homicide rates rose steadily from 7.8 per 100,000 people in 
that year to 21.5 per 100,000 by the end of his term in 2012. 
The public has taken a measure of police performance, as indicated 
by the polling results displayed in the table below. For 2015, across the 
region, 65 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the police and 
only 35 percent were satisfied. When broken down by high- and low-
crime countries, the differences are slight.  
Table 1.  Latin American Public’s Police Ratings, 2015 
 Dissatisfied 
with police 
perfor-
mance (in 
%) 
Increasing-
ly respect 
human 
rights (% 
yes) 
Well-
trained 
(% yes) 
Increas-
ingly 
efficient 
(% yes) 
Increas-
ingly 
transpar-
ent (% 
yes) 
Region1 64.7 15.5 16.3 17.1 10.3 
High-
Crime 
Coun-
tries 
67.0 15.3 14.1 15.1 9.4 
Low-
Crime 
Coun-
tries 
60.6 16.5 19.6 17.7 10.6 
Note:  1 Country N=16. High-crime states are El Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras, 
Guatemala. Low-crime states are Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. Other 
states fall in between.  
Source:  Latinobarómetro 2015 online statistics. 
Exploring the dimensions to that dissatisfaction reveals that only small 
minorities believe the police respect human rights, are well-trained, and 
are efficient and transparent. Again, the differences between high- and 
low-crime countries are negligible. If the public perceives that the police 
have little regard for human rights, this is an indication it does not trust 
the police to protect them. Citizens will not report crimes to policemen 
who are known to be habitually abusive and violent, convinced that 
doing so would only personally expose them to greater danger (Brinks 
2008). Police agencies that lack transparency, concealing malfeasance 
while protecting corrupt officers, will not elicit much faith among the 
citizenry. These arguments are buttressed by a review of 27 recent stud-
ies, which indicates that the strongest predictor of citizen dissatisfaction 
with the police is having had a negative encounter with law enforcement 
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(Johnson 2015). Negative encounters could include violent run-ins with 
policemen or requests for bribes. 
Police corruption in particular might lead to low satisfaction with 
the police. Previous studies have shown, in various contexts, that public 
experiences of police corruption reduce public confidence in the police 
(Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Tankebe 2010; Weitzer and Tuch 2005), 
and also negatively affect the legitimacy of the political system (Cruz 
2015). There is widespread evidence of police corruption in Latin Amer-
ica (Cawley 2013), but do the armed forces fare better? In order to ad-
dress this question, we used two survey items present in the 2014 wave 
of the Americas Barometer, which asked respondents whether a po-
lice/military officer had asked them to pay a bribe in the last 12 months. 
Figure 3 presents the percentage of respondents in various Latin Ameri-
can countries who reported having been asked to pay a bribe by the 
police and the percentage of respondents who reported having been 
asked to pay a bribe by the military in the last 12 months.  
The figure makes it clear that the police are much more likely than 
the armed forces to request bribes from Latin American citizens. While 
only 2.5 percent of Latin Americans report having been requested to pay 
a bribe by a military officer, 11.5 percent report that a police officer 
asked them to pay a bribe. In several countries (Bolivia, Mexico, Para-
guay, and Peru), almost one in five respondents were asked to pay a 
bribe by the police. The comparison between corruption in the police 
and corruption in the armed forces is particularly relevant in countries 
where the military takes an active role in the fight against criminal vio-
lence. In countries such as Brazil, El Salvador, and Mexico, these survey 
data clearly show that the military operates in a much less corrupt way 
than the police. 
According to the study mentioned earlier by Johnson (2015), the 
second-most important factor driving dissatisfaction with police is a fear 
of crime and disorder in one’s neighborhood. If a victimized and fearful 
public has lost faith in law enforcement, it can respond in several ways. 
The middle and upper classes will often retreat to gated communities 
where they pay for the services of private security squads. Poorer com-
munities have sometimes resorted to vigilantism, taking law enforcement 
into their own hands. However, another, more widespread response has 
been to demand that governments deploy the armed forces to either 
supplement or supplant the police in the fight against organized crime. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Citizens Who Were Asked to Pay Bribes (Police 
vs. Army), 2014 
 
Source:  LAPOP 2014. 
Is there evidence for stronger support for military intervention to fight 
crime among Latin American people who have negative interactions with 
the police, are dissatisfied with the performance with the police, or have 
been victimized? Again, we can take advantage of several survey ques-
tions included in the 2012 and 2014 waves of the Americas Barometer to 
answer this question. Through a series of statistical models, we estimate 
the impact of crime victimization, fear of crime, satisfaction with the 
police, and receiving a bribe by the police in the last 12 months on re-
spondents’ likelihood of supporting a military intervention to fight crime. 
We also include two variables to evaluate the effect of trust in the armed 
forces (models 1–4), and citizens’ views about the army’s human rights 
record (models 5–8) on support for military intervention in the fight 
against crime. We control for the basic socio-demographic characteristics 
of the respondents (age, gender, income, and level of education). The 
variables used in the analysis are described in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
All the empirical models in this paper apply multilevel techniques that 
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distinguish between two levels; that is, the individual level and the coun-
try level.4  
As expected, the results reported in Table 2 show that crime victims 
and people who fear crime are more likely to support an active role of 
the military in fighting crime. So too are people who are not satisfied 
with the performance of the police and people who have been asked for 
a bribe by law enforcement in the last 12 months. The coefficients for all 
these variables are in the expected direction and statistically significant in 
the eight models in Table 2. In sum, Latin American people who have 
been victimized or who have negative interactions with the police are 
more supportive of an active military role in the fight against crime.  
If people want the military to fight crime, does that also translate in-
to support for repression? Carreras (2013: 101) asked whether public 
disenchantment with how state institutions have responded to crime 
could soften opposition to “quasi-authoritarian means to reestablish 
order?” In other words, citizens who desire military intervention may 
presume that human rights violations will occur, but do not seem trou-
bled by that fact. Indeed, there is evidence that citizens exposed to crime 
and institutional ineffectiveness in Latin America favor “get tough” poli-
cies (Buchanan et al. 2012) and even vigilantism (Nivette 2016) in re-
sponse. The issue is whether they expect the armed forces in particular 
to resort to excessive force, resulting in human rights violations?  
  
                                                 
4  Hierarchical models allow for a more precise estimation of individual-level 
factors because they control for important contextual factors that may bias the 
estimates of variances and their associated standard errors (Gelman and Hill 
2006; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
  16 David Pion-Berlin and Miguel Carreras 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Support for Military Intervention in Fighting Crime 
(LAPOP 2012 and 2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -.001* -.001* -.000 -.001*
 (.000) (.000) (.000) ( .000)
Male .034* .039* .027 .028
 (.015) (.015) ( .022) (.015)
Income -.000 -.000 .013* -.000
 (.002) (.002) (.004) (.002)
Education -.020* -.017* -.025* -.018*
 (.006) (.006) (.009) (.006)
Trust in the armed forces .201** .200** .212** .201**
 (.004) (.004) (.006) (.004)
Army respects human rights 
 
Crime victim .162**
 (.020)
Fear crime .022*
 (.008)
Satisfaction with police -.096**
 (.015)
Bribe by police (last 12 months) .114**
 (.024)
Constant 4.609** 4.582** 4.601** 4.629**
 (.099) (.101) (.113) (.099)
N individuals 47,664 47,618 23,891 47,529
N countries 19 19 19 19
Note:  * p<0.05; ** p<0.1. 
 
Survey results indicate that, in contrast to perceptions about the police, 
the armed forces are considered well trained and respectful of human 
rights, as can be observed in Figure 4.5 The figure shows that, on aver-
age, only 25 percent of respondents believe that the armed forces do not 
respect human rights. By contrast, 60.5 percent of respondents believe 
that the army is well trained and organized. With very few exceptions, 
the public in Latin American countries appears to trust the professional-
ism of the armed forces and to believe that the army respects human 
rights.  
                                                 
5  This figure reports the percentage of respondents who believe that the army 1) 
does not respect human rights (answers 1-3 in a 1-7 scale) and 2) is well trained 
and organized (answers 5-7 in a 1-7 scale). 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age -.001* -.001* -.000 -.001* 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Male .048* .053* .043 .043* 
(.015) (.015) (.022) (.016) 
Income -.001 -.000 .010* -.000 
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.003) 
Education -.021* -.017* -.029* -.019* 
(.006) (.006) (.009) (.006) 
Trust in the armed forces  
 
Army respects human rights .189** .188** .184** .188** 
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.004) 
Crime victim .163**  
(.020)  
Fear crime .019*  
(.009)  
Satisfaction with police -.082**  
(.015)  
Bribe by police (last 12 months) .108** 
(.025) 
Constant 4.723** 4.702** 4.815** 4.745** 
(.108) (.110) (.123) (.107) 
N individuals 46,862 46,823 23,590 46,738 
N countries 19 19 19 19 
 
 
 
There may be an association between increased belief in military respect-
ing human rights and public desire for it to intervene to fight crime. Data 
from Mexico shows that as belief that the military respects human rights 
increases, so too does support for military policing activities, both to 
complement police and to patrol city streets on its own. At the same 
time, as the perception that police respect human rights decreases, sup-
port for the army’s counter-crime role increases. Moreover, the public 
associates the effectiveness of the military counter-crime effort with 
greater respect for human rights, not less (Bailey, Parás, and Vargas 2011). 
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Figure 4. Perceptions of the Professionalism of the Armed Forces (2012) 
 
Source:  LAPOP 2012. 
The results presented in Table 2 extend the Mexican findings to 19 
countries in the Latin American region. In fact, trust in the army and the 
perception that the army respects human rights are key predictors of 
support for military intervention in the fight against crime. In other 
words, Latin American citizens do not appear to be willing to give a 
blank check to the armed forces to intervene unilaterally in policy im-
plementation or in the fight against criminal violence, which could lead 
to authoritarian excesses, including human rights abuses. On the contra-
ry, the evidence suggests that they support targeted military operations 
when they are not satisfied with the performance of the police and when 
they have confidence that the army will do a better job at respecting 
citizens’ rights and liberties. In other words, the public support for mili-
tary crime intervention is not an endorsement of repression so much as 
it is a belief – accurate or not – that the military can, compared to the 
police, more capably combat criminal elements without harming inno-
cent civilians to the same degree.6 
                                                 
6  One study of Mexico showed that awareness of crime nationally leads people 
to have less tolerance for extra-legal (violent) action to deter crime (Malone 
2013: 37). 
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Public perceptions seem to square with the actual conduct of the 
armed forces, when engaged in domestic security operations. Empirical 
evidence based on an investigation conducted by David Pion-Berlin and 
Andrew Ivey indicates that very few civilian casualties result as a conse-
quence of military domestic operations. They conducted research in 
eight countries between 2013 and 2015 into civilian injuries and fatalities 
resulting from military internal security operations of one kind or anoth-
er.7 Five of these countries were among those with the highest crime 
rates in Latin America, while three were lower-crime states. The armed 
forces were used to fight crime, suppress protests (including land and 
oilfield occupations), eradicate illicit coca production, and counter gang 
and cartel activity. They found data for 60 such operations in all, involv-
ing army units, joint task forces, and a few naval forces. They recorded 
81 injuries and 52 deaths, with 39 of those deaths (75 percent) occurring 
in Mexico. In other words, there was less than one fatality per operation, 
on average. Leaving Mexico out of the equation, 33 operations resulted 
in just 13 fatalities across seven countries in three years; in other words 
one fatality for every 2.5 operations.  
Naturally, unreliable reporting and attempts to conceal wrongdoing 
may have suppressed coverage, resulting in an underestimation of civilian 
casualties. Moreover, this is just one study that must be balanced with 
investigations conducted by respected NGOs detailing disturbing pat-
terns of abuse at the hands of army units in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and 
elsewhere.8 The military record is by no means unblemished. That having 
been said, the key revelation of our study is that the public’s yearning for 
                                                 
7  This is an unpublished paper. Countries studied were Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, between 2013 and 
2015. Data on those countries was retrieved from Human Rights Watch, Am-
nesty International, Latin American Weekly Reports, Latin American Security and 
Strategic Reviews, and newspaper articles from Access World News and Lexis-Nexis. 
8  Examples of these reports include: Human Rights Watch, “Ni seguridad ni 
derechos: Ejecuciones, desapariciones y tortura en la ‘guerra contra el narco-
tráfico’ de México,” New York, November 2011, online: <www.hrw.org/sit 
es/default/files/reports/mexico1111spwebwcover.pdf>; Mexican Commission 
for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, “Jurisdicción militar: Im-
punidad y violaciones a los derechos humanos,” January 2013, online: <www. 
cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmcpdh-briefing-enero-2013-justicia-militar-sk. 
pdf>; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
the situation of human rights in Colombia, 7 January 2013, online: <www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-
HRC-22-17-Add3_English.pdf>; Amnesty International, “Colombia” Report, 
online: <www.amnestyusa.org/reports/annual-report-colombia-2013/> (all 30 
October 2017). 
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military counter-crime intervention is not a belief that the military is 
ideally suited for these missions nor an endorsement of repression so 
much as an expression of frustration over police failures and a belief that 
the military is, comparatively speaking, more capable of meeting the chal-
lenge of widespread crime. The public’s support for the military to con-
duct crime-fighting more efficaciously and humanely is a relative – not 
absolute – affirmation. 
Conclusion 
The public is justifiably unnerved by the unprecedented escalation of 
violence and criminality throughout much of the Latin American region. 
In light of the apparent inability or unwillingness of the police to ade-
quately confront the problem, it is also understandable that the public 
would favor the introduction of troops to chase down drug traffickers 
and patrol city streets. However, such support cannot be interpreted as 
an endorsement of uninhibited repression on the part of soldiers. Find-
ings from Mexico, and more generalized statistical results, strongly sug-
gest that the public evaluates military performance in light of police in-
adequacies. Disenchanted with corrupt, poorly trained police who tram-
ple upon citizens’ rights, the public views the military as a comparatively 
more professional force capable of responding to crime more effica-
ciously and humanely. Support for military crime fighting rises as satis-
faction with the police declines.  
These findings are encouraging in so far as they do not indicate a 
public preference for unfettered military operations that resort to exces-
sive violence and any and all extra-legal measures to stem crime. While 
citizens want to live a more secure life, they are not willing to pay just 
any price for it. They want the military to intervene and to use lethal 
force if they must, but to do so judiciously, with protections for human 
rights in mind. The evidence is consistent with the notion that the mili-
tary ought to be trained to operate within the rule of law and under clear 
rules of engagement. Soldiers should be given guidelines for operating in 
densely populated urban settings, where their violent encounters with 
cartels or gangs often occur just a hair’s breath away from civilian dwell-
ings. In those encounters, it is incumbent upon the military to show 
some restraint, carefully discriminating between criminal targets and law-
abiding residents who live nearby (Pion-Berlin 2017). All of this assumes 
that the military of a given country is capable of change, of being re-
socialized to be much more circumspect and restrained than it is long 
accustomed to. Some Latin American militaries are fundamentally re-
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sistant to change of this sort, fending off all efforts to revamp their mo-
dus operandi. 
This point raises a question that suggests the need for further re-
search. What if citizen views are wrong? What if they have falsely at-
tributed to the military, admirable qualities that are lacking, and thus put 
their faith in an institution that cannot really deliver on its promises? As 
mentioned, there is evidence suggesting that the armed forces of some 
Latin American countries do commit human rights abuses during inter-
nal security operations. Moreover, in the case of Mexico there is scholar-
ly research showing that the introduction of that country’s armed forces 
into counter-crime operations has not reduced homicide rates, and in 
some instances may have increased them (Calderón et al. 2015); and yet, 
public confidence in the armed forces remained unshaken. A recent 
public opinion survey found that 82 percent of Mexicans want the army 
and marines to continue patrolling city streets in pursuit of criminals 
(CESOP 2016) – consequences notwithstanding. What then prompts 
citizens to retain faith in their military, even in the face of facts that do 
not reflect well upon that institution’s performance? Citizens may con-
clude that there are no better alternatives, or they could be misinformed, 
convinced that the armed forces are up to the task when they are not. 
Additional research is needed to determine what drives these percep-
tions. 
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Fuerzas armadas, policía, y la lucha contra el crimen en América 
Latina  
Resumen: Durante las últimas dos décadas, las fuerzas armadas fueron 
llamadas a ocupar un rol cada vez más activo en la lucha contra una 
criminalidad en aumento en América latina. Dado que las fuerzas arma-
das de la región no siempre están bien entrenadas para usar la fuerza en 
el ámbito civil, la posibilidad de excesos y violaciones a los derechos 
humanos siempre está latente. A pesar de esta posibilidad, las interven-
ciones militares en la lucha contra el crimen son generalmente bien reci-
bidas por la opinión pública en la región. El argumento central de este 
artículo es que el apoyo a las intervenciones militares en la lucha contra 
el crimen se debe a que los ciudadanos latinoamericanos tienen muy 
poca confianza en la capacidad de la policía para luchar contra el crimen 
de manera efectiva y respetando los derechos humanos. Por el contrario, 
depositan más confianza en las fuerzas armadas como una institución 
capaz de actuar de manera efectiva, y respetando los derechos humanos 
y el estado de derecho. Este estudio desarrolla estos argumentos y luego 
usa datos recientes del Barómetro de las Américas que muestran clara-
mente que los ciudadanos latinoamericanos depositan más confianza en 
las fuerzas armadas que en la policía. Las fuerzas armadas son vistas 
como una institución más capaz de luchar de manera efectiva y humana 
contra la violencia criminal que la fuerza policial. 
Palabras clave: América Latina, criminalidad, fuerzas armadas, actitudes 
autoritarias  
  Armed Forces, Police and Crime-fighting in Latin America 25
 

 
Appendix 
Table A1. Variables Used in Models Presented in Table 2  
Variables Survey Items 
Age Age of the respondents 
Gender 1=male, 0=female 
Income 10 deciles based on the currency and 
distribution of the country  
(no income=0 … maximum income=10) 
Education Years of schooling:  
recoded into 0=no education, 1=1 to 3 
years, 2=4 to 6 years, 3=7 to 9 years, 
4=10 to 12 years, 5=13 to 15 years, 
6=16 to 18 years 
Trust in the armed forces To what extent do you trust the Armed 
Forces?  
1=Not at all … 7=A lot 
Army respects human 
rights 
To what extent do you believe that the 
[nationality] Armed Forces respect [na-
tionality’s] human rights nowadays?  
1=Not at all … 7=A lot 
Crime victim Have you been a victim of any type of 
crime in the past 12 months?  
That is, have you been a victim of rob-
bery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, 
extortion, violent threats or any other 
type of crime in the past 12 months?  
0=No, 1=Yes 
Fear crime Speaking of the neighborhood where 
you live and thinking of the possibility of 
being assaulted or robbed, do you feel 
very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat 
unsafe or very unsafe?  
1=Very safe, 2=Somewhat safe, 
3=Somewhat unsafe, 4=Very unsafe 
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Variables Survey Items 
Satisfaction with the police In general, are you very satisfied, satis-
fied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with 
the performance of the police in your 
neighborhood?  
1=Very dissatisfied, 2=Dissatisfied, 
3=Satisfied, 4=Very satisfied 
Bribe by police (last 12 
months) 
Has a police officer asked you for a bribe 
in the last twelve months?  
0=No, 1=Yes 
Source:  LAPOP 2012. 
 
